What Is The Virtual Phenomenalism?

Hybrid combination of material with virtual objects through (virtual) space and synthesis. The degree of immersion in this virtual component of the players associated with the hybrid (virtual-material) space may be different, but for them the material reality does not disappear completely. In this section, the constitution of hybrid spaces, virtual-material from the point of view of the actors, is reconstructed. On the technological side, the reality/virtuality continuum includes all possible variations and combinations of real and virtual objects (Milgram et al., 1994; Milgram and Colquhoun, 1999).

The reality/virtual continuum is described as a concept in new media and computer science, but interestingly, our own everyday phenomenology also contains elements that we see as “unreal” (optical illusions, benign pseudo-illusions) Or just dispersed or not confined to the substance at all. space, eg. For example “not of this world”, “invisible” or “spirit” (i.e. spiritual behavior and spiritual wandering; see Metzinger, 2015, 2017). Philosophers must never forget that the reality/virtual continuum itself only appears in the virtual models that our brains activate. Like “sense of place” or “sense of presence” in virtual reality, spatial phenomenology is a fleeting concept.


According to Immanuel Kant, space and time are a priori forms and premises of all sensory experience, “relating to objects only insofar as they are regarded as phenomena, but not of things themselves.” George Berkeley ( George Berkeley) that objects are merely bundles of sensations (bundle theory), Immanuel Kant claimed (unlike other bundle theorists) that when objects are no longer perceived by some mere human beings, they are not cease to exist. theme or idea. Although Immanuel Kant insists that knowledge is limited to phenomena, he never denies or excludes the existence of objects, things-in-itself, or noumenons that experience cannot know, even though he has never experienced them.

However, the most understandable formulation of phenomenalism as an epistemological theory of the possibility of knowing objects of the external world is contained in the transcendental aesthetics of Immanuel Kant. The idea of ​​logical positivists such as A. J. Ayer and Rudolph Carnap was to formulate the doctrine of phenomenalism in linguistic terms in order to define references to entities such as physical objects in an external world outside of existence. In particular, some forms of phenomenalism reduce all talk about physical objects in the outside world to talk about bundles of sensory data.

In epistemology and the philosophy of perception, phenomenalism is the idea that physical objects exist not as things in themselves, but only as perceptual phenomena or sensory stimuli (for example, the phenomenon formulated by Ernst Mach, on the contrary, is the idea that objects are logically constructed perceptual properties John Stuart Mill developed a theory of perception, which is commonly called classical phenomenalism.


Michael Madari explores visual experience using both phenomenological and empirical research methods. Phenomenological and empirical methods of studying visual experience converge in support of the thesis that visual perception is a continuous process of anticipation and realization. This collection of essays explores the history, implications, and utility of phenomenology for the study of real and virtual places. This article explores promising points of convergence between philosophy and the expanding field of virtual reality research.

With interfaces that support sensorimotor interaction, virtual reality can causally allow certain phenomenal properties to be realized in the human user’s brain. As they move, act and communicate in the online world, actors build structured relationships and create spaces made up of virtual objects and creatures and their associated contemporaries. Users not only encounter virtual models of other bodies, but also real themselves—other agents as autonomously experiencing subjects, sharing the intersubjective phenomenology of existence with each other. In the case of video chats, not all types of virtual presences and virtual self-experiences exist, but the online presences created provide participants with a certain spatial experience.

Its virtual character lies in the quality of its entities, which have their attributes without sharing a physical form (real or imagined), but only creating a functional emulation of real objects. The first order virtual agent will be controlled by the AI ​​using it as a communication interface.


By definition, machine-generated virtual content is also unreal, although it can be interestingly mixed with real-world elements, such as in augmented reality (AR) configurations. For example, talking about “virtual objects” or even “virtual worlds” created by a machine does not justify the assumption that only the operation of the system itself changes physical reality in any interesting way.

Some philosophers have raised objections to phenomenalism, arguing that if these hypothetical propositions play such an important role in the analysis of phenomena—analyzing all expressions of material objects in light of actual and possible sensory experience—it would still be difficult to avoid the use of material— object expression. in “if. A third common objection is that phenomenalism attempts to transform judgments about material objects into hypothetical judgments about sensibleness, assuming the existence of an irreducible material observer in the antecedents of the conditions. Of course, the same statement contains references to physical objects and should be replaced with representations of sensory data, but the point is clear enough.

This post was proofread with Grammarly.

Leave a Reply